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a national health service, by comparison 
 
 
Richard Freeman 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The NHS has always been compared to other things, to other organisations and 
systems both at home and abroad.  This paper explores those comparisons, 
beginning with the origins of national public health care in Lloyd George's study 
of German social insurance, and ending with Gordon Brown's claims for the NHS 
as 'the best insurance policy in the world'.  It considers the comparisons and 
contrasts made for and with the NHS at the time of its foundation and the 
comparison of state and market around 1990, before reviewing the contemporary 
function of comparison as form and basis of health governance.  The paper 
presents three related patterns of thought: one prompted by encounter with the 
other, one sustained by metaphor and one developed in more formal, analytic 
comparison.  It concludes by discussing why comparison itself is such a 
dangerous and contested thing. 
 
 
Keywords: National Health Service; health policy; comparison; metaphor; 
learning; governance 
 
 
 
The question I start off with is: what are we and what are we today? (Michel 
Foucault)1 
 
Foucault's question explains his interest in 'the genealogy of problems'.  His 
point, famously, as he puts it elsewhere, was 'not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous', and that dealing with (and thinking about) what is 
dangerous gives us something to do.2  Now, that might be the occasion for a 
synoptic essay on health, if not the whole of human history.  All I am concerned 
                                                     
1
 In Lotringer 1996, p 411, cit Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003, p 430. 
2
 Foucault 1984, p 343, cit Bernstein 1992, p 157. 
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with here, however, is a particular aspect of a way of thinking in and about the 
NHS. 
 
I'm interested in the part comparison plays in the 'genealogy of problems' which 
have formed and defined the NHS.  A hundred years ago, in August 1908, Lloyd 
George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, went to Germany, where he met 
officials responsible for the operation and administration of Bismarck's social 
insurance programmes.  Much taken with what he saw and heard, he returned to 
England to commit the government to the compulsory, contributory health 
insurance scheme for which it legislated in 1911.  A hundred years later, more or 
less, in September 2007, Gordon Brown, now Prime Minister, described the 
National Health Service as 'the best insurance policy in the world'.3  At each end 
of the hundred-year span of public health care in Britain, that is to say, as well as 
periodically in between, its architects and administrators have drawn 
comparisons with their counterparts in other countries.  Those comparisons have 
by turns informed and inspired, provoked and pressured those who make them 
and have them made for them.   
 
Comparing countries is continuous with comparing forms of organisation, as 
debates about planning and professionalism, the state and the market 
demonstrate.  In turn, comparing organisations – and individuals - by various 
means of performance assessment has become a principal mechanism of health 
governance.  Now, comparisons are everywhere.  There is little thinking in or 
about the NHS without them. 
 
Comparison and policy 
 
Of course, to the extent that there is little thinking of any kind without them, 
comparisons appear trivial.  We know what something is at least in part by 
knowing what it is not.  We know who we are by comparing ourselves to others, 
and noting the characterisations they make of us.  That suggests comparison is 
ordinary and often mundane, but not, in fact, trivial.  Even more fundamentally, 
comparison underpins our systems and structures of thought; it is embedded in 
our language.  The concepts we use derive their power and specificity – their 
very meaning – from their patterns of similarity with others: in this way, our 
thought is metaphorical.4  More explicit comparisons, meanwhile, entail 
categories: to posit and explore a likeness between things supposes that they 
are comparable, that they are members of some set of things which have like 
qualities.  By the same token, they entail contrasts, the noting of difference and 
the drawing of divisions and distinctions. And these are deeply significant, even 
dangerous things, as I shall try to show. 
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 <http://www.labour.org.uk/conference/brown_speech>, accessed 1 June 2008. For discussion, 
see below. 
4
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But I want to begin by noting the academic use of cross-national comparison by 
economists, sociologists and political scientists in trying to understand the NHS.  
This has its own history, its sources in Titmuss's elaboration of different models 
of welfare state and Anderson's more empirical specification of kinds of health 
system.5  Throughout, the function and purpose of comparison has been 
essentially twofold: to evaluate (that is, to work out what kinds of health care 
organisation, system or policy seem most effective in meeting specified criteria) 
and to explain (that is, to work out why different health systems, as well as the 
social, economic and political systems in which they are embedded, seem to 
work in the way they do).  On both counts, comparison is associated with claims 
for learning: both evaluation and explanation, developed in this way, seem to 
carry important lessons for policy makers.  In this standard version, comparison 
appears to belong properly to the academy, while the comparisons drawn by 
politicians and policy makers are regularly dismissed as 'policy warfare'.6  It is 
consistently said that the cross-national comparisons which recur in health policy 
debate are inappropriate, unjustified or invalid.  But we should recognise that 
they are made, nevertheless. 
 
What comparativists have missed is that comparison is a condition of policy 
making, not an abstract, analytic process by which it might be informed and 
understood (whether well or badly).  In a foundational paper published half a 
century ago, Charles Lindblom drew attention to what he called 'successive 
limited comparison' as the normal condition or process of policy making.7  In 
contrast to the ideal assumption of a 'rational-comprehensive method', policy 
makers engage in successive comparison of a contingent and restricted range of 
alternatives, unguided by formal theory.  The purpose and outcome of such 
comparison is discovered ad hoc, as those comparisons are made, debated and 
agreed or discarded. 
 
What, then, do we mean by comparison?  Can we define it in such a way as to 
make sense of both academic and policy making standards and practices?  
James Sully defined comparison as 'that act of the mind by which it concentrates 
attention on two mental contents in such a way as to ascertain their relation of 
similarity or dissimilarity.  By a mental content is meant either a presentation or a 
representation'.8  His definition has several important implications.  First, he 
emphasises that comparison is volitional process, in which the mind actively 
relates and makes sense of (at least) two objects.  Second, Sully argues that our 
assessments of similarity and difference are informed by what we take to be 
normal or usual degrees of each: 'In truth, the problem of ascertaining a bare 
resemblance or difference continually tends to become a question of estimating 
its degree in relation to some customary standard'.9  For what is customary is 
                                                     
5
 Titmuss 1974; Anderson 1963; Freeman and Marmor 2003, Marmor, Freeman and Okma 2005. 
6
 Marmor and Plowden 1991. 
7
 Lindblom 1959. 
8
 Sully 1885, p 490. 
9
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collectively determined: to this extent at least, cognition-by-comparison is a social 
process.  As Mary Douglas has it so simply, 'similarity is an institution'.10  Third, 
note Sully's ancillary definition of 'a mental content' as 'either a presentation or a 
representation'.11  Comparison takes place not between things themselves, but 
between impressions and appreciations of them, mediated by the way they are 
presented to us. 
 
Comparison, then, is an active process, socially shaped and informed, which 
constructs relationships of similarity and difference between things, or more 
precisely representations of things.  It is more active than assimilative; it is more 
than interpretation, and might be better described as translation.  For it takes 
place somewhere between two objects, themselves less than fully defined.  It is 
an unstable, mediating process, in which objects become defined in relation to 
each other, in that process of being compared.  In this sense, comparison is 
generative rather than reflective, a mode of production as much as of regulation. 
 
So what comparisons do policy makers make, both explicitly and implicitly, and 
what should we make of them?  This paper explores the comparisons which 
appear to have defined the NHS.  The three central parts of the paper highlight 
three forms of thinking 'by comparison': through encounters with others, through 
metaphor and by the construction of formal categories.  The schema is historical, 
as befits this journal, but that is not to claim that these three thought styles 
succeed each other.  Rather, they are closely impacted one upon the other; they 
entail each other.  All three depend, in turn, on the dangerous business of 
resemblance, which is treated in a concluding section.  It goes without saying 
that the paper is risky and experimental, as comparisons are. 
 
 
the NHS and its others 
 
Britain and Germany 
 
Lloyd George arrived in Germany on 6 August, 1908, in the company of Harold 
Spender, a journalist, and the parliamentarian Charles Henry and his wife.  Henry 
paid for the trip, which was part holiday (a 'motor tour'), part covert diplomatic 
exercise and part study visit.  The diplomacy concerned the intensifying naval 
competition between Britain and Germany, which the Chancellor had taken upon 
himself to try to moderate. But he was also concerned with unemployment at 
home, and how its effects might be alleviated.  He went to Berlin on the 21st 
August, where he met Bethman-Hollweg, then Minister of the Interior and later 
himself German Chancellor.  He looked around the Imperial Insurance Office and 
went to Hamburg on the 23rd, returning to England on the 26th. 
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 Douglas 1986, Freeman and Frisina, forthcoming. 
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What he discovered was that the invalidity and old age pensions schemes he 
was interested in were not only more extensive and effective than he had first 
understood, but also that they were predicated on a complementary sickness 
insurance scheme.  Taking their cue from him, a delegation of trade union 
leaders followed Lloyd George to Germany a few months later, in November.  
Further studies of social insurance in Belgium and Austria were produced by the 
end of the year, by civil servants who themselves made visits to respective 
countries. 
 
By April 1909, in delivering his budget speech, the Chancellor felt able to commit 
in principle to a system of compulsory, contributory national insurance, shifting 
policy away from earlier proposals for a more limited, tax-funded scheme.12  The 
period which followed was one of learning from German administrative detail, 
and included sending his adviser Braithwaite back to Berlin for more information 
at the end of December 1910.  Leaving the German capital, Braithwaite enjoyed 
a run through the Brenner to brief the Chancellor a couple of days later on the 
pier in Nice.13 
 
When it was presented to Parliament on 4 May, 1911, the National Insurance Bill 
was supported by a general explanatory memorandum, a detailed comparison of 
German arrangements with the proposed British scheme,14 and a further 
collection of accounts by German workers, employers and administrative 
authorities testifying to the merits of social insurance.  In his speech to the 
Commons, Lloyd George referred nine times to German precedent, as both 
positive and negative example as well as to claim superiority for he what he set 
out.  In turn, the British debate was followed closely by the German authorities. 
The Ministry of the Interior evaluated the British scheme from an official German 
point of view, and briefed the Kaiser accordingly. 
 
Policy-makers' attitudes to Germany over the period, as Hennock describes 
them, were characterised by 'revulsion, imitation and rivalry'.15  For Lloyd 
George, Germany was a source of ideas but also ambition, which he realised in 
doing things more cheaply.  Braithwaite, 'Lloyd George's ambulance driver',16 
had been horrified by the bureaucracy of the German scheme and was 
determined to do things differently.  Though Britain, following Germany, 
developed a health insurance scheme, the structures of contributions and 
benefits (uniform in Britain, in Germany proportionate to salary), though 
'outwardly so similar in kind', were 'inwardly completely different'.17 
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 Hennock 1987. 
13
 Braithwaite 1957, pp 82ff. 
14
 For detailed discussion of that comparison, following all its manipulations and ramifications, see 
Hennock 1987, chapter 12. 
15
 Hennock 1987, p 176. 
16
 Braithwaite 1957. 
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 Hennock 1987, p 200. 
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By the early 1900s, Germany had become Britain's most significant other, a 
model and rival in Europe, if not the world.  Germany was interesting to policy 
makers and reformers because its industrial development was that most closely 
comparable to Britain's (Hennock 1987, p 32).  Its systems of technical education 
and town planning in particular were recognised as standard-setting (or what we 
might now term benchmarks).  But to the extent that Germany was seen to be 
increasingly strong and increasingly successful, that very comparability was a 
source of uncertainty.  This was a period of international exhibitions and 
congresses, of what Sutcliffe described as 'creative internationalism' (Hennock 
1987, p 29), but also of incipient crisis in international relations.  Policy makers 
seemed to be negotiating a complicated love-hate relationship with some 'other 
who is also the same'.18 
 
Warfare and welfare 
 
The NHS was conceived within the framework of a 'welfare state'.  The 
significance of this idea lay in its being counterposed to that of the 'warfare state', 
though it also betrayed (even reprised) an ambivalent relationship with Germany.  
In his seminal use of it in 1941, Archbishop William Temple meant to contrast the 
welfare state with Germany's warfare state, though it also held then unnoticed 
connotations of the German Wohlfahrtsstaat (welfare state), the origins of which 
lie at least as far as back as state theorist Gottlob von Justi's Staatswirtschaft 
(1759)19 and had been current among social reformers since Bismarck. 
 
The National Health Service was a nationalisation of health services, like those of 
rail, coal and gas which took place at almost exactly the same time, in 1948.  
Health care was, by implication, a public good, part of the national infrastructure 
and better run by government than by private enterprise.  Though sorely 
challenged in the 1990s, assumptions about health care have held firmer and for 
longer than they have in respect of the utilities.  Bevan's NHS – still Bevan's, as 
Labour health ministers still acknowledge at party conferences – has retained 
something of the aura which has protected Reith's BBC. 
 
At the same time, of course, it was and is very unlike other welfare services.  
Public health had always been local government business, as education and 
housing were, and as social work would be.  Bevan's trick in negotiating with 
local government, hospital, medical and other interests was to propose a 
combination of nationalisation and regionalisation,20 keeping health away from 
local authorities.  Its effective local units were Hospital Management Committees, 
which were controlled by doctors.  Paradoxically, the hierarchical subordination 
of health care to central government was, most notably for the professions, a way 
of avoiding government, a way in which health care would remain an arena of 
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 The phrase is de Beauvoir's, from The Second Sex, which she uses in explaining 
phenomenologically the way men value other men more than women: Heinämaa 2003, p 126. 
19
 Kruse, Porta and Saraceno 1997, 
20
 Webster 2002. 
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'private government'.21  Health care took place somewhere apart from 
government, in a world of its own, even as it was nationalised. 
 
Government, medicine and health 
 
There followed a period in which the health service, in this world of its own, 
seems to have been much less concerned with comparison or with the world 
outside.  This period, which, perhaps not coincidentally, appears in retrospect as 
the 'golden age' of the NHS, was one of relative certainty about what it was and 
what it was for.  Its politics concerned the relationship between government and 
medicine, between professional and administrative authority.  Administrative logic 
- or what then counted for administrative logic - achieved its fullest expression in 
the reorganisation of 1974. 
 
In the background, there was continued wondering about what it meant or should 
mean to be a National Health Service rather than a National Sickness Service, 
and what the relationships between individual and public health and health and 
health care should be.  In practice, however, these shored up rather than 
threatened the assumptions underpinning the NHS.  Revisiting the distinction 
between health service and local government responsibilities for health resulted 
only in it being resolved in favour of the NHS, for example,22 while debates about 
'prevention' seemed to be a way of managing the boundaries between the health 
service and its environment.23 
 
Meanwhile, the NHS had made the mutual dependence of profession and state 
obvious.  Before then, and even in some ways since, it had been obscured by a 
tradition of Anglo-Saxon thought which assumes that professions and states can 
and should be independent of each other.  A very different continental tradition 
would more readily see the professions as part of the state (and, by the same 
token, the civil service as a profession).  The deal struck in 1946 was that the 
government had the money and the doctors had the medicine.  This made for 
what Rudolf Klein so memorably characterised as the 'politics of the double 
bed'.24  That's the analyst's metaphor, not the actors', and what it means 
depends on what you think goes on in double beds.  I infer 'not much, really' 
(though perhaps I'm just a bit tired) and I pursue the metaphor only because it 
seems to capture some of the existential tensions of the NHS even in its most 
established form.  Klein seems to give a sense of lives lived in parallel, partners 
needing each other but otherwise demanding very little, the pleasures of 
'propinquity'25 and routine occasionally disturbed only to return again to normal. 
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 Klein 1989, p 32. 
22
 DHSS 1988, Allsop and Freeman 1993. 
23
 Freeman 1992, 1995. 
24
 Klein 1990. 
25
 Klein 1990, p 702. 
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Things are always difficult when one partner starts getting at the other's habits.  
Part of the original deal, gladly overlooked in the first flush of things in 1946, was 
the consultants' right to use a small proportion of NHS beds to treat private 
patients.  Barbara Castle's attempt to abolish so called 'pay beds' made for 
protracted, bitter arguments in the 1970s.  A decade and a half later, however, 
the ideological poles of state and market, public and private appeared to be 
reversed. 
 
 
market and state, metaphor and reality 
 
Alain Enthoven was a 'whizz kid' ('the whizziest', in fact, as Time magazine 
claimed when it put him on its cover in June, 1963).26  He had joined Robert 
McNamara's Department of Defense in 1961, where he was part of the team 
which developed PPBS (the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System), which 
was a method by which different defense programmes could be compared with 
each other and evaluated in terms of cost and effectiveness.27  As the Vietnam 
conflict escalated, the method met with increasing opposition from military 
leaders and defence contractors (who saw their professional autonomy and 
market freedoms constrained), as well as anti-war protesters, who denounced it 
as unethical.  Enthoven's own memoir acknowledges its lack of success.28  He 
left the Department first for private industry and then for Stanford University, 
where he became Professor of Management and Health Care Economics in 
1973. 
 
Enthoven submitted a proposal for regulated competition in health care to the 
Carter administration in 1977, developing the idea further in numerous 
publications through the 1980s and 1990s.29  He was part of the Jackson Hole 
group, which emerged as the major provider of consultancy and advice to the 
Clintons' Presidential Health Care Task Force.30  He spent a year in London, 
meanwhile, in 1984-1985, when he was Rock Carling Fellow at the Nuffield 
Trust, producing papers which, though read by senior civil servants at the DHSS, 
initially found little resonance there.31 
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 <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874947,00.html>, accessed 1 June 2008. 
27
 This was part of an approach or set of instruments which Alice Rivlin, head of the 
Congressional Budget Office in the late 60s, called 'tools for systematic thinking'.  CBA (another 
military invention), network analysis, social indicators and social reporting and zero based 
budgeting all date from the sixties or earlier and have their roots in the US. McNamara was 
Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam war, had formerly been CEO of Ford and later moved 
onto the World Bank. 
28
 Enthoven and Smith 1971. 
29
 Enthoven 1978, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993. 
30
 Ellwood, Enthoven and Etheredge 1992. 
31
 My account of Alain Enthoven and managed competition owes much to Howard Waitzkin: see, 
for example, Waitzkin (1994). 
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Yet when, by 1988, successive Thatcher administrations had driven the NHS into 
a crisis of underfunding and underprovision, it was Enthoven's ideas which were 
called up by the Ministerial Review which led to the Working for Patients white 
paper of 1990.  Kenneth Clarke, who became Secretary of State midway through 
the Review in July 1988, though initially mistrustful, later acknowledged that 
Enthoven provided 'the germ of the idea'.32  'The idea' was based on the 
assumption that health care was like other goods which can be bought and sold 
in markets, according to standard principles of economic competition.  
Acknowledging particular problems in the supply of and demand for health care, 
that competition needs to be regulated in some way, or 'managed'. 
 
The Working for Patients proposals brought much protest, not least from doctors.  
Thatcher moved Clarke to Education and brought William Waldegrave to 
Richmond House, essentially to calm things down.  Talk of markets and 
competition declined, replaced by that of commissioning and contracting.  In 
retrospect, Waldegrave thought, 'we had got into a muddle between what was 
metaphor and what was reality'.33 
 
Waldegrave's observation is revealing.  For what is a metaphor, and why had this 
one caused such a muddle?  A metaphor is a kind of comparison, but one which 
works in a very powerful way.  Etymologically, derived from from the Greek, it 
means a 'carrying across' (the same process of derivation, from the Latin, gives 
us 'translation').  But this translation changes the terms of what is translated, 
such that the objects of comparison begin to colour each other, can only be 
understood in reciprocal terms.  As Mary Hesse explains, 'The metaphor works 
by transferring the associated ideas and implications of the secondary to the 
primary system.  These select, emphasise, or suppress features of the primary; 
new slants on the primary are illuminated; the primary is "seen through" the 
frame of the secondary… the two systems are seen as more like each other; they 
seem to interact and adapt to one another, even to the point of invalidating their 
original literal descriptions if these are understood in the new, post-metaphoric 
sense'.34  And this is what makes for the 'muddle'.  For the issue was (and 
remains) less whether or not the production and distribution of health care 
functions like a market, but that those should have become the terms of the 
debate.  It became necessary to describe (and defend) the NHS in terms – like 
production and distribution – consistent with those used to advocate its radical 
reform.  So what was the NHS now?35 
 
The muddle was the greater because the metaphor was deemed illegitimate. For 
it was the market – though it had rarely been thought of as such – which the NHS 
                                                     
32
 Ham 2000, p 7.  Clarke first thought of Enthoven as 'a right wing sort of eccentric who I don't 
agree with': Ham 2000, p7.  The effective extent of his influence has been questioned: see, for 
example, Martin Gorsky in this issue of SHM. 
33
 Ham 2000, p 30. 
34
 Hesse 1964, p 252. 
35
 For discussion of the origins and implications of the market metaphor, as well as of other 
metaphorical frames for thinking about the NHS, see Elkind 1998. 
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had been set up to replace.  And now what was at issue was an 'internal market', 
an internalisation of the other: the NHS was set to nurture processes which at the 
same time it sought to deny.  The operation and functioning of market processes, 
furthermore, was predicated on a managerial capacity only recently introduced 
into health care in Britain.36  And that had been the work of another outsider, Roy 
Griffiths, another invader from the other world of the firm. 
 
Enthoven's ideas were of uncertain heritage, alien and unformed, notoriously 
untested.  But they were also American ideas.  For some time now, of course, 
America had taken Germany's place in an awkward relationship (however 
'special') of competition and collaboration with the UK.  In the same way, the 
NHS had long been studied by US scholars, being read both positively (as a 
model of equity) and negatively (as 'socialized medicine', more or less the same 
thing), according to the cycles of America's own health policy agenda.37  On both 
sides of the Atlantic, metaphorical or comparative thinking – at least in public 
debate - appears limited by taboo, or what Deborah Stone has described as 'the 
assumption of the contaminated source'.38  This, too, accounts for some of the 
fury of the response to Feachem's comparison of the NHS with California's 
Kaiser Permanente, a health maintenance organisation (Feachem, Sekhri and 
White 2002).39 
 
 
comparison: the new health governance 
 
Comparison – of state with market, of public sector organisations with private 
sector ones – was part of the logic by which management was introduced into 
the NHS.  In turn, it became one of its principal tools.  Over the course of 1990s 
and into the next century, instruments of performance assessment were 
developed which compared organisations and individuals against notional best 
practice and each other.  The drafting of hospital league tables followed that of 
school league tables, hospital Trusts were given 'star ratings' (replaced in 2006 
by 'annual health checks'), different areas of delivery were matched to 'service 
frameworks', a Quality and Outcomes Framework was incorporated into the GP 
contract from 2004; surgical mortality rates are now (May 2008) to be published 
in England as they already are in Scotland.  NHS provider organisations are now 
intent upon 'world class commissioning'.  A series of new bodies (NICE, the 
Healthcare Commission and now an Institute for Innovation and Improvement), 
have been tasked with the management of comparison. 
 
This 'conduct of conduct' by comparison in increasingly routinised forms has 
taken place in not only in intranational, but also international domains.  It has 
become an aspect not only of NHS governance, but also of an emergent global 
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 National Health Service Management Inquiry 1983. 
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 Klein 1991. 
38
 Stone 1981, p 281. 
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 For more purposeful reflection, see Ham (2005). 
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health governance.  It was the OECD which set the terms of international debate 
in health policy (efficiency and cost containment) as well as providing its 
essential currency.40  Its Measuring Health Care appeared in 1985, and the 
statistical database OECD Health Data from 1993.  The health project's early 
emphasis on finance and productivity now includes measures of quality.  For all 
its problems, OECD statistical data has become ubiquitous in health policy 
making, providing points of orientation even for self-descriptions of national 
systems. 
 
WHO had experimented with targets in its Health for All programme launched in 
1977, but made explicit, evaluative comparison of national performance in health 
policy with the rankings presented in 2000's World Health Report.  The Report 
was met with substantial complaint as to its technical and methodological 
adequacy,41 and in particular as to the way it used composite indicators to 
measure performance.42  More radical criticism was made of its purpose43 and 
implications.44  Nevertheless, the Report and the reaction to it has made for more 
sophisticated discussion of methodological issues of cross-national comparison 
than had existed before.45 
 
The performativity of comparison 
 
International debates about health care turn on and in turn produce a sense of 
the equivalence of health systems.46  The attention to performance is itself 
performative: to compare is to designate respective entities as comparable, and 
so subject to evaluation and judgement.  The comparisons implicit and explicit in 
international journals and reports and which feature increasingly in national 
debates serve to institutionalise the commensurability of health systems; put 
another way, the concepts, indicators and data they depend on serve to resolve 
the incommensurability which makes systems difficult to govern.  How does this 
work? 
 
WHO and other performance assessment exercises take an instrument 
developed to measure industrial performance and apply it to health care, 
presuming the two to be comparable and in fact making them so.  It deploys 
composite indicators, categorisations which create new conceptual phenomena, 
and which are expressed in an abstract terminology which must be retranslated 
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 Klein 1991. 
41
 Almeida et al 2001. 
42
 Hurst and Jee-Hughes 2000, pp 15-16. 
43
 Williams 2001. 
44
 Navarro 2000, 2001. 
45
 Richardson et al 2003.  WHO's reflections on its benchmarking exercise, including responses 
to various criticisms of it are presented in WHO 2001.  It sought to improve data collection 
through its World Health Survey, while efforts at connecting (translating) its analysis to policy 
making were grouped under a new Enhancing Health Systems Performance Initiative.  For more 
detailed and wide-ranging discussion, see Murray and Evans 2003. 
46
 Claudio Radaelli, similarly, remarks on 'the OMC fascination that makes different things look 
similar': Radaelli 2003, p 32. 
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in order to make local sense.47  Benchmarking is a form of comparison which 
takes two (and usually many more) health services and makes them look more 
like each other and less like either or any of them was before. 
 
This is because every new case added to a category changes the way we think 
about both case and category, which is what is described in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge as the problem of 'meaning finitism': 'The essential point is 
that our classifications are always underdetermined by the promptings of 
experience or by previous acts of classification.  Each new application of a term 
is sociologically problematic… every act of classification has the form of a 
judgment, every act changes the basis for the next act, every act is defeasible 
and revisable, and every act involves reference, not just to the 'meaning' of the 
term applied, but also to the 'meaning' of all the other terms currently accepted 
for use in the context'.48  As Garfinkel has it, each application of a term is made 
for "another first time."49 
 
This makes the process of classification and comparison somehow fragile and 
uncertain.  That is to say that every comparison is a translation, an iteration 
between complex data and the conceptual vocabulary available to represent it, 
between empirical detail and the abstract and generic terms which best seem to 
fit.  It is a way of associating the datum with the theoretical construct, and both 
together with other similar associations.  The process changes both the way the 
datum is understood and the classificatory scheme which is the resource for that 
understanding.  Such changes are most evident in changes of nomenclature, and 
in the frequent addition and subtraction of categories or classes.  They are, 
moreover, collective processes, socially validated by researchers, policy makers 
and practitioners working in contexts which, whether by competition or 
collaboration (or both) they define for each other.  'Science and common-sense 
inquiry alike do not discover the ways in which events are grouped in the world; 
they invent ways of grouping'.50  To take up the terms of the previous section, 
they work metaphorically. 
 
The best insurance policy in the world 
 
In January 2000, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged to raise UK health 
spending, then taken to be just less than seven per cent of GDP, to the European 
average (eight per cent).51  The announcement was seemingly unplanned, made 
in a television interview as the government was under pressure from opposition 
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politicians and medical professional leaders over NHS capacity.  Asked where 
the money would come from, Blair discounted the prospect of higher taxation. 
 
Blair's announcement has been described as the most important single policy 
statement to be made about the NHS since Margaret Thatcher's announcement 
in 1988 of the review which led to the Working for Patients white paper and the 
'internal market' reforms of 1991.52  It was followed by much discussion about 
what it really meant: in particular, the government's figure of eight per cent of 
GDP for average health spending in the EU was contested, while a debate 
opened up about the possible sources of the promised extra investment.53 
 
Two months later, in March, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown 
committed substantially increased (five per cent in real terms) funding to the 
NHS.  The following year, in March 2001, he commissioned a review of the likely 
continuing resource needs of the NHS over the next twenty years.  In his final 
report submitted in April 2002, review chair Derek Wanless set out scenarios54 by 
which the NHS might 'catch up' and 'keep up'  both with 'other major countries' 
and, by extension, with best practice (mentioned in a covering letter to the 
Chancellor which accompanied the report).  These were predicated on a key 
recommendation that the principal means of financing the NHS (by general 
taxation) should remain the same.  This had been justified, in turn, by an interim 
report issued the previous November,55 which 'concluded that the current method 
by which health care is financed through general taxation is both a fair and 
efficient one, with no evidence that any alternative financing method to the UK's 
would deliver a given level of health care at a lower cost to the economy'.56 
 
Wanless's terms of reference had been specific about public funding.57  His 
interim report had distinguished two sources of such funding for health care: 
general taxation and social insurance.58  Placing the NHS clearly in the former 
category, his report argued strongly in favour of maintaining the existing system 
of funding by general taxation, noting the risks of social insurance systems' 
concentrating their revenue base on employment.59  In reaching this position, the 
review team had selected as benchmark comparators both European (France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) and Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, 
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New Zealand) countries, considering health outcomes as well as service inputs 
of financial, human and other technological resources.60 
 
Just before Wanless's final report was published, the Chancellor made a key 
speech which prefigured its conclusions and sought to shape the way it would be 
received and understood.  Following much of the argument of Wanless's interim 
statement, Brown reviewed alternative funding options for the NHS, including 
user charges, private insurance, social insurance and general taxation, 
concluding that the NHS as currently funded (by general taxation) could be 'the 
best insurance policy in the world'.  This is an extraordinary phrase, its intended 
effect derived from the paradox it represents.61  Think of the heuristic moves it 
entails. 
 
First, Blair's response to pressure is isomorphic: one way of dealing with 
uncertainty is to do what others do, to seek safety in numbers.62  His implicit 
assumption is that Britain is like other European countries (by the same token, 
there is no suggestion that health spending in the UK should match that of the 
US or Australia or Taiwan).  Second, and more subtly, what is being said is that 
respective countries are comparable, and that cross-national comparison is a 
relevant and productive way of knowing and thinking about health care in the UK.  
Blair's comparison is performative: in the terms of this paper, what is being 
enacted is the idea that comparison is both possible and appropriate.  It is in this 
context that Wanless's review was undertaken.  Wanless establishes not only 
that Britain is like other countries, but also that its health system is more 
specifically comparable with theirs in respect of goals, inputs and outcomes.63  
His report provides Brown with a set of ideal types of health care funding, a 
vocabulary of categories. 
 
Brown in turn reproduces and then transforms these, conflating them into what 
becomes a superordinate category of 'insurance'.  Moving to a higher level of 
                                                     
60
 As well as consulting widely within the UK, the team visited Australia, Canada and the US 
before presenting its interim findings, and then France, Germany and Sweden (as well as holding 
discussions with representatives of the Netherlands) before making its final report.  It also 
commissioned case studies of eight countries' health care systems (which included New Zealand 
and Denmark as well as the other European countries mentioned). 
61
 It is also clearly intended to be the signal phrase of the speech as a whole: it is first used as the 
Chancellor begins to discuss health financing by general taxation, contrasting it with private 
insurance.  It occurs again in a long sentence which ends the speech's penultimate paragraph: 
'… reformed and renewed, [the NHS] can be the most efficient and equitable guarantee of health 
care for millions, provide the better choices and service they need and become, for the British 
people, the best insurance policy in the world: the best for each of us and the best for all of us.'  It 
then comprises its closing words. This is also a line Brown has returned to several times: in 
delivering his budget in April 2002, in speaking to the British Council in July 2004 and to union 
leaders at the TUC conference in September 2006 as well as in his first speech to the Labour 
conference as Prime Minister (above). 
62
 DiMaggio and Powell 1983. 
63
 In 1992, OECD had noted a basic similarity across countries in the goals or objectives of health 
policy, including adequate coverage, equity in access supported by income protection, freedom of 
choice for consumers and autonomy for providers: OECD 1992. 
   15
abstraction, Brown establishes a commonality between all health systems in 
Europe based principally on the collective management of risk.  But there is a 
further move still, a fourth.  Brown's ambition is to devise the 'best' insurance 
policy: where Blair identifies a behavioural norm (average health spending), 
Brown indicates a normative standard, 'the best'.64  His comparison is not only 
associative but evaluative; more precisely, it associates in order to evaluate.  It is 
a benchmarking statement. 
 
 
a National Health Service, by comparison 
 
I want to reflect on three aspects of these comparisons in and of the NHS.  The 
first is to take up the idea first mooted at the beginning of the paper and echoed 
along the way, which is why comparison appears dangerous.  It seems to follow 
from that that it is important, and worth further consideration.  So my second 
reflection is on what it might mean to study comparison more intensively and 
extensively than I have been able to here.  And the third is to reflect on the kinds 
of comparison I have identified, to go back to Foucault, and to wonder about the 
historical emergence of comparison he describes. 
 
Comparison and risk 
 
In context, Hennock's 'revulsion, imitation and rivalry' are intuitively compelling.  
They seem, moreover, to have been sustained over time: they characterise 
responses to rankings and arguments about organisation just as much ministerial 
encounters abroad.  They surely denote something more than simple 'learning' 
by comparison.  They are kinds of learning, but the comparisons they entail 
appear more subtle, complex, tentative and dangerous than that.  Why 
dangerous? 
 
Comparison is difficult just as learning is difficult.  It is concerned, ultimately, with 
an original, fundamental and primal distinction between self and other.  
Remember that we come to know and understand ourselves by developing our 
understanding of others' understandings of us.  Interpreting and negotiating those 
understandings is difficult, subtle and complex, and a source - because it has to 
do with who we are - of anxiety.  In Freudian psychology, and in a body of 
thought most closely associated with Melanie Klein, what is called 'splitting' is a 
critical stage of development, and overcoming it an important psychological task.  
For the small child, the other - the parent - is only ever entirely good or entirely 
bad; developing a less polarised, more nuanced understanding of the nature of 
difference is critical to psychic well-being.  Where that development is somehow 
impaired, where differences (and understanding of them) between self and other 
remain insecure, splitting continues to serve as a defence mechanism.  If 
boundaries are not clear, proximity and intimacy seem to risk fusion with the 
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other, and loss of self.  To preserve a sense of self, the other must be decried.  
But where there is no clear separation from an other which is now deemed bad, 
the self begins to seem bad, too.  This problem is solved by again reversing the 
poles of emotional logic, reconstructing both self and other as good.  Individual 
identity is persistently subject to these unstable oscillations. 
 
We worry about the NHS, not least because we think it is of existential 
significance.  For most of us, it is the guarantor of health care, and for many of us 
it provides other kinds of security such as income and employment, whether 
directly or indirectly.  We compare our hospital and our health service with 
others, perhaps in part to find ways of improving them but just as much to make 
sense of them, to find ways of understanding and thinking about them.  But this 
work of comparing call these things into question, reveals our securities as 
relative insecurities.  In this way, comparison is a development mechanism 
bound by a defence mechanism.  Doing it appropriately and effectively entails 
deeply significant emotional as well as intellectual work. 
 
Learning, too – and here learning and comparison become virtually 
indistinguishable - is a kind of risk-taking.  As Bateson observed, it is inevitably 
bound up with anxiety.65  It implies leaving behind what we do in order to do 
something else, or to do it differently.  To learn is somehow to overcome who we 
are: it implies relinquishing, momentarily, who we are in order to find ourselves 
anew.  In this context, the new governance arrangements give order to 
comparison.  They internalise and institutionalise it, developing what we might 
call a 'contained comparison', disciplined rather than undisciplined.  They seek 
an improbable systematisation of metaphorical thinking, the taming of learning. 
 
Comparison as an object of study 
 
So what should we, the academy, do with comparison?  Where does this leave 
comparative health policy, comparative politics and public policy, comparative 
history?  My argument here suggests that comparativists have both 
overestimated and underestimated comparison.  They have overestimated the 
prospect of policy makers and practitioners learning from comparative research – 
or, perhaps better, they have failed to theorise fully what tends to be 
characterised as the resistance or stickiness of institutions.  At the same time, 
they have underestimated or failed to appreciate the comparisons that policy 
makers and practitioners themselves make.  And it is these which drive – literally 
'make up' – health policy and practice. 
 
Comparison tends to have been favoured more by political scientists and policy 
researchers, commentators and analysts than by historians.  Yet, as I have tried 
to show here, comparing is a process that unfolds in and over time.  
Comparisons have a history, which means not that we need comparative history 
but that we need a history of comparisons. 
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We need this, I think, because in order to understand the development of things 
like hospitals and health services, we need to know what policy makers know, 
what made it possible to think, to imagine, to plan certain kinds of things and not 
others.  And by the same token, we will come to understand the epistemology of 
contemporary policy making by relating it to others both previous and proximate 
– that is, by comparison. 
 
I have used the idea of comparison here both specifically and generically, 
describing the new health governance as predicated on comparison but referring 
to other ways of thinking - exploratory and metaphorical – as comparative, too.66  
The typology (itself a provisional act of comparison) was developed through 
historical questioning but makes no claim that different ways of 'doing 
comparison' are historically ordered.  Each of them remains in play at each point 
in time, and their reciprocal relations – the way one seems to entail the other – 
warrants further investigation.  The thinking behind 'world class commissioning' 
would not have seemed so strange to William Braithwaite. 
 
Comparison and resemblance 
 
This might be because similarity is prior to difference.  As Andrew Cooper 
explains, drawing on Bateson and Wittgenstein, 'For there to be "difference 
between", there must be a relation other than difference, which is similarity'.67  
The work of comparison is to create those relationships of difference out of 
similarity. 
 
After that passage from Borges,68 and after Velázquez and Las Meninas,69 
Foucault turns, in The Order of Things, to the matter of resemblance. Up to the 
end of the sixteenth century, he explains, Western thought was constituted 
through the production and explication of resemblance, through describing the 
ways in which one thing was echoed, mirrored, reflected and repeated in 
another.  In an array of 'similitudes', or ways of constructing resemblance, four 
were key: simple 'convenience' (meaning here, as in its Latin root, adjacency or 
juxtaposition); emulation, or resemblance without the requirement of physical 
proximity; analogy, or resemblance between relationships rather than between 
things, and sympathy.  'Sympathy plays through the depths of the universe in a 
free state.  It can traverse the vastest spaces in an instant… it can be brought 
into being by a simple contact'.  What is more, it 'excites the things of the world to 
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movement and can draw even the most distant of them together.  It is a principle 
of mobility'.  And further: 'Sympathy is an instance of the Same so strong and so 
insistent that it will not rest content to be merely one of the forms of likeness; it 
has the dangerous power of assimilating, of rendering things identical to one 
another, of mingling them, of causing their individuality to disappear – and thus of 
rendering them foreign to what they were before'.70 
 
Foucault turns then, as does the world he describes, to representation, language, 
classification and exchange, to a system of thought predicated on comparison.  
Comparison amounts to the testing or proving of resemblance, through 
measurement, definition and the production and precision of categories.  'The 
activity of the mind… no longer consist[s] in drawing things together, in setting 
out on a quest for everything that might reveal some sort of kinship, attraction, or 
secretly shared nature within them, but, on the contrary, in discriminating'.71 
 
I want to question only the order or succession of his order of things.  Whatever 
sympathy is, it seems to be just as characteristic of globalised, homogenised 
contemporary governance as comparison does.  Comparison does not replace 
resemblance but is predicated on it, follows it, pursues it: 'At the border of 
knowledge, similitude is that barely sketched form, that rudimentary relation 
which knowledge must overlay to its full extent, but which continues, indefinitely, 
to reside below knowledge in the manner of a mute and ineffaceable necessity'.72 
 
What, then, is in the name?  What do we mean when we speak of the National 
Health Service?  Back to Velázquez, Philip IV and Las Meninas: 'It is in vain that 
we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say.  And it is in vain 
that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors or similes' – or 
comparisons – 'what we are saying… the proper name, in this particular context, 
is merely an artifice: it gives us a finger to point with, in other words, to pass 
surreptitiously from the space where one speaks to the space where one looks; 
in other words, to fold one over the other as though they were equivalents'.73 
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